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Response
Gary Krueger
My response reviews and extends slightly the work of Dr. Vladimir
Popov on Russia’s unique transition to market economy. Using Russia
as an example, my hope is also to shed light on important areas of eco-
nomics in general, especially as they relate to the social and legal infra-
structures that form the basis of what I term “pathological” economic
systems.1 At the outset, it is important to note that I have no fundamen-
tal disagreements with the conclusions and basic viewpoints of Dr.
Popov. As is typical of academics, however, I do not necessarily concur
with the course he pursued to reach those conclusions. The following
represents an alternative and, hopefully, illuminating path to arrive at
a somewhat different diagnosis of Russian economic maladies, as well
as a similar, but not identical, prescription.
Dr. Popov begins by assessing the initial conditions inherited by the
transition countries of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and
Southeast Asia, and finding that the countries of the former Soviet
Union tended to have the worst performance, measured in terms of
total decline in output, among the transition economies. He also mea-
sures, and then assesses, the role of the legacies of central planning in
affecting variations in transition outcomes. Popov then makes the
noteworthy conclusion that the institutional structure of transition
economies appears better able to predict transition performance than
the rate of liberalization.2 This important finding elevates the debate
from the level of an overly simplistic and unproductive argument con-
cerning the merits, or lack thereof, of shock therapy versus some unde-
fined gradual alternative. Not only is this a valuable contribution, but
the author also makes his point directly and clearly.
In the second part of his essay, Popov links poor Russian economic
performance during the transition to an inability to increase exports,
pointing out that export-led growth — as demonstrated by the transi-
tion economies of China and Vietnam and earlier by the market
economies of Japan, Korea, and other Asian economies — can place a
country on the road to sustainable development. Additionally, Popov
identifies the key role of exchange-rate policy, and explains how Rus-
sia’s decision to maintain its exchange rate at levels that were above
purchasing power parity was a serious policy mistake. Also, he cites
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the failure of the Yeltsin government to support key sectors of the
economy, especially aerospace and energy.
II. Analysis and Suggested Extension
The evidence for the main conclusion—that the rate of liberalization is
less important than the institutional structure shepherding the move
away from central planning — is, however, a bit suspect. The leading
witness is figure 3 which plots the decline in the share of government
revenues from 1989 – 91 to 1993 – 96 as a variable that explains the
decline in output from 1989 to 1996. Figure 3 shows that countries with
larger declines in the shares of government spending as a percentage
of GNP tended to have larger declines in total output from 1990 to
1996. Of course, Popov uses this variable as a proxy for the institu-
tional strength in these countries, but it is a problematic variable to use
in a regression. As government spending was a large share of total
production in centrally planned economies, the fact that declines in
government spending correlate with declines in GNP is not altogether
startling. The reason is, of course, seen directly from basic macroeco-
nomics as GNP = C + I + G + X – M, where GNP is gross national
product, C is aggregate consumption, I is domestic investment, G is
government spending, and X – M is net exports (crudely put as trade
balance). In other words, a decline in one of the components of an
aggregate statistic correlates with the decline in that statistic.3
Popov’s other primary finding is that Russian policy-makers failed
because they did not strategically target investment to export sectors of
the economy, and they pursued a policy of an overvalued exchange
rate. The conclusion — prescription really — is that export-led growth,
which was successfully implemented in Asia, is the best approach for
alleviating Russia’s transition depression. The evidence that Asian
growth was based on exports is, however, not conclusive.
For much of Japan’s post-war history, Japan had either no surplus
on current account or only a small surplus. Not until the early to mid-
1980s did Japan begin to run significant surpluses, by which time it
had already achieved its stature as a world economic leader. More-
over, exports as a share of GNP in Japan in 1980 were 14 percent, while
in 1994 they had fallen to only 9 percent, according to the World Bank
Development Report of 1996. These percentages are low enough to
suggest that most economic activity in Japan was domestic, although
at the margin, exports were highly beneficial. China initially (after the
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implementation of Dengism in 1979) appeared not to rely on exports
but, rather, on increased productivity in agriculture and rural enter-
prises. Only in the later 1980s and early 1990s do we see the large sur-
pluses on external account. In sum, I believe it is not clear that (a)
Asian economies were exceptionally dependent upon exports as a
source of growth or (b) this prescription is suitable for a large continen-
tal, resource-rich country such as Russia.
III. An Alternative Diagnosis
In order to better understand the situation in Russia, we need some
basic macroeconomics, or just about everything you might need to
know if you worked for the IMF or World Bank in the Applied Macro
Division.4 An analysis of the basic components of GNP, and the associ-
ated accounting rule, provide some insight into Russia’s transition
recession. More formally, these components can be expressed as:
Y = C + I + G + X – M (1)
Y = GNP (gross national product)
C = consumption by private citizens of goods and services
I = domestic investment (purchases of durable goods — plants, equip-
ment, etc.)
G = spending by government on goods and services (excludes transfer
payments to pensioners, etc.)
X = exports (sales of goods and services abroad)
M = imports (purchases of goods and services from abroad)
X – M = balance on current account, also called “external balance”
Y = C + S + T (2) (Accounting Rule)
Y, C as defined above
S = personal savings by individuals plus retained earnings by busi-
nesses
T = taxes collected by government
Equation 2 is referred to as an accounting rule because all income must
either be spent, saved, or taxed.
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Equations (1) and (2) can be easily shown to imply the following rela-
tionships:
(S – I) + (T – G) = (X – M) (3)
S – I is the balance between savings and investment, or the private sec-
tor balance. T – G is the balance between taxes and government spend-
ing, or the public sector balance. The private sector surplus or deficit
will influence the external balance, as will the public sector surplus or
deficit. Countries with deficit on current account may have them for
numerous reasons. One may be that the public sector is imbalanced
(G>>T); another is that I>>S (where “>>” is read as strictly greater
than).
Finally, we should note the following identity from international
balance of payments accounting:
External balance on = opposite balance + changes in holdings
current account on capital account of reserve currencies
Countries with surplus on current account run deficits on capital
account; that is, they import more assets from abroad than they export,
and vice versa. Since 1981, the United States has run current account
deficit and capital account surplus: we sell more assets (T-bills, stocks,
corporate bonds, land) to foreigners than we buy from abroad. In other
words, the United States is a net debtor, while Japan is in the exact
opposite position, a net creditor.
The situation in Russia throughout the transition has been unique:
declines in GNP of upwards of 50 percent since 1990, accompanied by
a decidedly negative public sector balance on the order of – 8 percent
of GNP, a very large percentage.5 The large public sector imbalance
would suggest that the current account also ought to be negative, yet
the Russian economy has consistently run surpluses on current
account since 1992. Obviously, the only source of surplus on current
account must be very large surpluses in the private sector. In other
words, Russian savings must be significantly larger (by approximately
10 percent or so) than investment.
Recent data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) shows that investment declined by 75 percent
from 1990 to 1996, considerably more than the total decline in output
of roughly 40 percent.6 Admittedly, the figure from 1990 represents
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investment levels that were excessive by international standards; nev-
ertheless, the declines in investment appear to have “led” declines in
GNP. The question then is: Why are investment levels so low in Rus-
sia?
Popov’s figure 3 may not be very useful for causal inference. But if
we turn the causality around and posit that the decline in output led to
the decline in government spending (as governments facing declining
output and tax receipts were forced to cut back expenditures) and,
additionally, if we examine the Russian government’s peculiar
response to the situation, we have insight into the large decline in
investment.
Local and federal government agencies in Russia issue budgetary
authority; that is, they write a contract with a private or semiprivate
organization for some good or service based on anticipated budget
revenue. During the budget period, it is invariably discovered that tax
revenues are lower than expected. Lower tax revenues risk upsetting
fiscal balance (the relationship between tax receipts and government
expenditures), which threatens to re-ignite high inflation.7 In order to
reduce the risk of inflation, government agencies delay payment of
contractual obligations for months or sometimes years at a time. Thus,
the government reneges on its own declared budgetary (presumably)
contractual obligations. Throughout history, there have been instances
of government default on securities, and there have been hyperinfla-
tions — which amounts to the same thing — but rarely has there been
systematic and sustained contractual recklessness comparable to that
demonstrated by the current central government in Russia.
Why is the emphasis on contracts so important and how does it
relate to investment? The late Mancur Olson, in analyzing economic
development, asked the question: If almost everyone now has a market
economy, and if markets are so good, then why isn’t everyone
wealthy? His inquiry led him to consider the institutional framework
that supports market transactions. Most interestingly, he considered
the institutional “requirements” necessary for supporting two types of
transactions. Type I transactions are those in which the “quid”
(money) is exchanged simultaneously for the “quo.” Examples of Type
I transactions are everyday purchases of groceries and beer at the
kiosk, or even drug deals on the west side of Chicago. The latter exam-
ple illustrates the fact that the institutional infrastructure necessary to
support Type I transactions may be very meager (i.e., total lawless-
ness); furthermore, highly risky Type I transactions, in which both par-
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ties desire to exchange, are very common throughout the world. The
key to Type I transactions is that they do not require external, or third
party, enforcement. Because they are, in principle, self-enforcing, it is a
relatively simple matter to ensure that the quid and the quo are both
genuine and delivered. Equally important, because they are simply
reallocating preexisting production, they are not wealth creating,
although they are pareto improving.
Consider now an alternative type of transaction, the Type II, in
which the exchange of the quid and the receipt of the quo are sepa-
rated in time—specifically, a transaction in which one receives the quo
prior to paying the quid. Generally, the quo may be paid for over time
as, for example, when one buys a house or a car (in developed market
economies, that is). The key to these Type II transactions is that they
are relatively more complex to effect and generally are based on very
explicit written or oral contracts/agreements.
Additionally, Type II transactions are capable of generating wealth
(in other words, a “stream” of additional income that lasts for consid-
erable periods of time). An example would be college loans, of which I
am a past expert. The loan allows the recipient to avoid a pay-as-you-
go approach to getting an academic degree, thereby reducing the total
time necessary to get that degree. This permits more years of addi-
tional earning power at the educationally augmented level, hence cre-
ating wealth.
Mancur Olson’s insight into understanding problems of develop-
ment, particularly those plaguing the Former Soviet Union (FSU), is
based upon consideration of the institutional infrastructure necessary
to support Type II — wealth-creating — transactions. The key to effect-
ing Type II transactions is third-party enforcement, especially as it
relates to ensuring that the recipient of the quo pays back the quid. It is
possible, I believe, to generally classify economic systems, or
economies in particular, based upon the dominant type of enforcement
of contractual arrangements. In the United States, we seem to prefer
courts stuffed with lawyers. In Japan, there are, of course, lawyers, but
there is also a premium placed on trust inherent in long-standing rela-
tionships.
In the current Russian economy, there is considerable competition
for the rights to enforce contracts — especially within the mafia.
Although economists generally regard competition as a good thing,
when it comes to the right to enforce contracts, it is better to have a
monopolist—the government. However, the Russian government is so
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weak, partly because of its own actions and partly because of the
upheavals during the past decade, that it lacks the ability to secure a
monopoly position in contract enforcement. When contractual rights
are impossible to guarantee and enforce, potential lenders — that is,
savers—hide their capital either under the proverbial mattress (one of
my Russian friends has $20,000 in his garage wall) or send it abroad.
As a result, very few wealth-creating Type II transactions are taking
place in Russia, although lots of pareto-improving Type I transactions
are happening.
One indicator of the severity of the current situation in Russia is
contained in the preceding Table, which provides data on nonfinancial
commercial credit as a percentage of GNP in Russia. If lots of Type II
transactions were occurring, we would expect a sizeable amount of
credit to the private sector as a percent of GDP. But the figures in the
Table reveal that Russia ranked far below other transition economies
in 1996, and my guess is that figures for 1998 will show further reduc-
tions. Of course, it is possible to have too much of a good thing, and
the high percentages of credit relative to GDP in Bulgaria and the
Czech Republic were inflationary. But the levels of credit in Russia
were undeniably well below the more “normal” levels of Poland and
Hungary.
IV. Conclusion
Finally, I want to repeat that my analysis and that of Dr. Popov lead us
to the same basic conclusions. In short, Russia’s transition recession
was exacerbated by government policies — specifically, its exchange-
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Table 1 Commercial Bank Credit in Transition Economies:
Credit to the Nonfinancial Sector as Percent of GDP
1993 1994 1995 1996
Russian Federation 20.4 19.6 12.0 10.4
Poland 21.3 19.8 19.7 22.1
Hungary 28.4 26.5 23.0 22.9
Czech Republic 73.1 72.9 63.8 61.1
Slovakia 71.5 60.4 59.2 62.4
Romania 24.4 19.0 22.7 24.6
Slovenia 22.2 22.9 27.5 28.7
Bulgaria 67.8 51.0 41.3 69.5
Source: OECD Economic Surveys (1997), p. 92.
rate policy and fiscal irresponsibility. And Russian institutions have
proved themselves woefully inadequate to sustain a well-functioning
market economy. In six years of transition, the Russian political and
economic elite have failed to create institutions that support Olson’s
Type II transactions. The almost total absence of capital markets has
had disastrous consequences for what remains of Russian industry.
Firms that make and sell durable goods find that their potential cus-
tomers can only purchase durable products from cash on hand, while
the funds to restructure production in durable-goods industries (and
hence increase Russian competitiveness) are virtually unavailable.
Because Russia is a market economy without a capital market, it has
become a unique economic subspecies: a noncapitalist market econ-
omy.
Notes
1. The numerous works of the late Mancur Olson, especially on the relationship between
forms of government and economic prosperity, are enlightening.
2. This conclusion appears, however, to assume that these countries will indeed liberal-
ize and not revert to central planning or some other statist policies.
3. In addition, these data should also be adjusted for differences in starting points for the
transition; after all Poland and other Central European countries began the transition
roughly two to three years before the countries of the former Soviet Union.
4. The following material represents the first time since conducting a review session as a
teaching assistant at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1984 that I, an applied
micro-economist, have performed public macroeconomics!
5. For example, at the peak of the U.S. government deficit in the late 1980s, the public
sector deficit was on the order of –3 percent of GNP.
6. There is some controversy in measuring the decline in output during Russia’s transi-
tion. Original Goskomstat data suggest a decline of 50 percent from 1990 to 1996, while a
recent revision in their calculations places the decline in total output at 37 percent. Of
course, none of these estimates captures the large share of production taking place in the
underground economy.
7. In the early phase of the transition (1992 – 94), Russian inflation was typically in the
range of 20–40 percent per month!
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